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INSIGHT ON OVERSIGHT: 
THE ROLE OF INFORMATION COMMISSIONERS IN THE 
IMPLEMENTATION OF ACCESS TO INFORMATION POLICIES 
BY SARAH HOLSEN∗ AND MARTIAL PASQUIER† 
 
 
What factors impede “Access to Information (ATI)” laws – or make them effective?   
Drawing on international experience and analyses of ten different countries, Holsen 
and Pasquier describe and analyze several different forms of ATI implementation. 
Factors considered include the oversight bodies’ powers, independence, resources, 
and leadership. Special consideration is given to appeals processes and types of 
enforcement. In this context, the benefits of the “Information Commissioner” 
model have been found to outweigh its drawbacks. 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
Over the past decade more than 50 countries have passed access to information (ATI) laws and 
many are in the process of drafting legislation; the total number of ATI acts in force worldwide now 
stands at 90 or more. 1  These policies, implemented by government administrative bodies, are 
founded on the idea that the administration in a given country is obliged to disclose to the public 
information that it holds and/or creates. The objectives of ATI laws are to increase transparency, 
accountability, and trust in government; foster better understanding of government decision-making; 
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1 These laws are alternatively called ATI (Access to Information), FOI (Freedom of Information), or RTI (Right to 
Information) legislation. For the sake of consistency, the term ATI is used in the remainder of this article except when 
quoting others’ work or referring to the names of laws that use the other two acronyms. Meanwhile, there is no 
agreement on the precise number of ATI laws in existence. McIntosh argues that it depends on the definition of ATI – 
whether it is a law that has been passed, signed, or gone into force – as well as what one considers a country, e.g. the 
Cayman Islands. See Toby McIntosh, “FOI Laws: Counts Vary Depending on Definitions,” Freedominfo.org, Oct. 28, 
2011, accessed Oct. 1, 2012, http://www.freedominfo.org/2011/10/foi-laws-counts-vary-slightly-depending-on-
definitions/. Those keeping track, however, agree that the number of ATI policies stands at around 90. See Roger 
Vleugels, “Fringe Special: Overview of All FOI Laws,” white paper, Oct. 9, 2011, accessed Oct. 1, 2012, 
http://right2info.org/resources/publications/Fringe%20Special%20-%2090%20FOIAs%20-
%20sep%207%202009.pdf; Access Info Europe and Centre for Law and Democracy, “Global Right to Information 
Rating Map,” Sept. 28, 2011, accessed Oct. 1, 2012, http://www.rti-rating.org/index.html; Open Society Justice 
Initiative, “Access to Information Laws: Overview and Statutory Goals,” right2info.org, Jan. 2012, accessed Oct. 1, 
2012, http://right2info.org/access-to-information-laws. 
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encourage increased participation in the political process; and improve government efficiency 
through exposure of waste and corruption.2 
As with all government policies, however, there are problems with the implementation of ATI, 
which can make it difficult for a law’s aims to be achieved. These include an administration’s 
resistance to disclosing information and insufficient resources, both of which can lead to incorrectly 
or unjustly withheld information and delays in responding to requests. The enforcement of the law 
is crucial to alleviating or even preventing these problems. Several different kinds of enforcement 
mechanisms can be found in existing ATI laws. In some jurisdictions information requesters must 
take their appeals or complaints about improper compliance or non-compliance to court; however, 
in the majority enforcement is carried out by a quasi-judicial organization that oversees the 
administration’s compliance with the legislation. This entity is commonly called an oversight body. 
The two most common types of ATI oversight body are the ombudsman and the information 
commissioner. The ombudsman, an institution first established in Sweden in 1809, is “a special 
office or officer to whom people can go with their grievances about the way… large anonymous 
bureaucracies” have treated them.3 The office of the information commissioner grew out of the 
ombudsman tradition but commissioners play a more specialized role than their progenitors. 
Whereas most ombudsmen handle all complaints of illegal or unjust administration, the information 
commissioner’s remit is specifically limited to ATI-related appeals or complaints.4 Most information 
commissioners also fulfill additional responsibilities such as providing guidance to administrative 
bodies about complying with the legislation and instructing the public on how to use the law; 
monitoring and assessing the administration’s compliance with the legislation; and promoting the 
policy. The ability to carry out these functions is boosted by powers granted by law such as the 
authority to access any documents called into question as part of an appeal, or to issue binding (i.e. 
legally enforceable) decisions. An information commissioner’s independence is also considered 
crucial to the organization’s capacity to carry out its mandate. 
Notwithstanding the fact that “some independent external review mechanism is critical to [an ATI] 
law’s overall effectiveness,” there is little academic research on how oversight bodies work.5 This 
article contributes to the literature by providing an overview of the characteristics of the information 
commissioner that are considered important to their effectiveness. It begins with some background 
information on ATI laws and then turns to problems with the implementation of these policies. The 
second half of the article looks at ten information commissioner offices and explains how these 
organizations fit into the implementation process of their respective ATI regimes, including the 
                                                          
2 Toby Mendel, Freedom of Information: A Comparative Legal Survey, 2nd Ed. (Paris: UNESCO, 2008); Robert Hazell, 
Benjamin Worthy, and Mark Glover, The Impact of the Freedom of Information Act on Central Government in the UK: Does FOI 
Work? (Hampshire, UK: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010); Transparency International, Global Corruption Report 2003: Special 
Focus: Access to Information (London: Profile Books, 2003). 
3 Gerald E. Caiden, Niall MacDermot, and Ake Sandler, “The Institution of Ombudsman,” in International Handbook of 
the Ombudsman: Evolution and Present Function, ed. Gerald E. Caiden (Westport, Connecticut: Greenwood Press, 1983), 3. 
4 Personal communication with Linda Reif, International Ombudsman Institute, Nov. 14, 2008.  
5 Laura Neuman, “Access to Information Laws: Pieces of the Puzzle – An Analysis of the International Norms,” white 
paper, The Carter Center (2006), 10. 
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tasks they carry out, the powers they are granted by law, and the legal conditions that contribute to 
their independence. It then offers some points for consideration when assessing the effectiveness of 
the information commissioner model. 
 
HISTORICAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND ON ATI LAWS 
The modern ATI law’s predecessor made its appearance in 1766 when the Swedish government 
included in the country’s constitution the right to information for the general public and specific 
rights to information for members of the press.6 The United States Freedom of Information Act, 
passed 200 years later, influenced the countries that followed: for example Australia (1982), Canada 
(1982), Japan (1999), and the United Kingdom (2000).7 Prior to the mid-1990s fewer than 20 laws 
existed; since 2001 over 50 nations have granted people the right to access information. Recognition 
of the importance of openness can be seen in the fact that the passage and implementation of an 
ATI law is one of four criteria countries must fulfill to be considered for membership in the new 
Open Government Partnership initiative, an international effort formed in September 2011 to 
“secure concrete commitments from governments [around the world] to promote transparency, 
empower citizens, fight corruption, and harness new technologies to strengthen governance.”8  
One significant influence on the effectiveness of access regimes, according to academic consensus, is 
the “strength” of the procedural mechanisms specified in the laws. These include who can make a 
request, how a person can request information, whether a fee is charged for making requests, how 
long the administrative office has to answer the request, which categories of information are exempt 
from disclosure, and how the law is enforced. Although a few countries have laws requiring that the 
requester be a citizen, a resident, or a company based in the country (e.g. Canada, New Zealand, 
India), in most jurisdictions anyone can request information from the government (e.g. United 
States, Mexico, Slovenia, Japan). Requests in a few jurisdictions can be made over the phone or in 
person (e.g. Switzerland, India), but in most they must be submitted in writing (e.g. United 
Kingdom, United States). In some countries requesters must pay to ask for information (e.g. Ireland, 
where a request costs €15), but in most there is no set fee, although coverage of administrative costs 
such as photocopying and postage might be charged (e.g. United Kingdom, United States). Nearly 
                                                          
6 Kingdom of Sweden, Fundamental Rights and Freedoms (1766); The Freedom of the Press Act (1766). 
7 Christopher Hood, “Transparency in Historical Perspective,” in Transparency: The Key to Better Governance?, ed. 
Christopher Hood and David Heald (Oxford: British Academy/Oxford University Press, 2006), 3-23; David Banisar, 
“Freedom of Information Around the World 2006: A Global Survey of Access to Government Information Laws,” 
white paper, Privacy International (2006), accessed Oct. 1, 2012, 
http://www.freedominfo.org/documents/global_survey2006.pdf. 
8 Open Government Partnership, “About,” accessed Oct. 1, 2012, http://www.opengovpartnership.org/about. The 
remaining three criteria are fiscal transparency, citizen participation, and disclosure of elected and senior public officials’ 
income and assets. A country can earn a set number of points within each of these categories; a successful candidate 
country will have 75% or more of the total possible points. In the category of ATI policy, a country receives four points 
for having a law in force; three for having the principle of access to information in its constitution; or one for having a 
draft law prepared for enactment. At the time this article was written, 55 countries had fulfilled the requirements to join 
the Open Government Partnership. 
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all ATI laws require that administrative offices disclose requested information within a set 
timeframe, which ranges from 15 days in Canada to 30 days in the United Kingdom and India.  
A frequently cited influence on the scope of information released in each country is the extent of 
information that need not be disclosed because it is specifically exempted. Government 
administrations are often criticized for generously applying exemptions to information requests in 
order to avoid disclosure. Common exemptions include national security, personal data, and 
international relations. Some laws also include blanket exemptions, which apply to all information 
held by a specific government organization, for example the Australian Inspector-General of 
Intelligence and Security.9 Some exemptions are absolute and protect data such as court records, 
third party personal data, and information given in confidence (e.g. by or to third parties) from 
unauthorized access. Others are subject to a public interest test, which requires the public authority 
to weigh whether the public interest in disclosing the information is stronger than that of 
withholding it.    
In all ATI laws, requesters can pursue at least one of several avenues of recourse if they do not 
receive the information they request or if they believe an administrative office has otherwise 
complied incorrectly with the act. These are internal review, external review, and litigation through 
the courts. See Table 1 below for a sample of appeal options in ten jurisdictions. Under internal 
review, a dissatisfied requester asks the office to which the request was submitted to reconsider its 
position. External review involves an appeal to an oversight body. If these fail to produce the 
desired outcome, requesters can take their appeal to the courts but often only on a point of law. The 
next section looks at the specifics of oversight bodies after a discussion of the implementation 
problems that prompt the need for an enforcement mechanism. 
  
                                                          
9 Commonwealth of Australia, “Secrecy Laws and Open Government in Australia” (ALRC Report 112) (Australian Law 
Reform Commission, Mar. 11, 2010), 549, accessed Oct. 1, 2012, 
http://www.alrc.gov.au/sites/default/files/pdfs/publications/ALRC112.pdf. 
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Table 1: Appeal Process Stages 
Country Internal review   Oversight body   Courts∗ 
Canada  ✔ ✔ 
Germany ✔ ✔† ✔ 
India‡ ✔‡ ✔ ✔ 
Ireland ✔ ✔ ✔ 
Mexico ✔† ✔ ✔ 
Slovenia  ✔ ✔ 
Scotland ✔ ✔ ✔ 
Switzerland  ✔ ✔ 
United Kingdom ✔ ✔ ✔ 
Australia ✔† ✔ ✔ 
* This column does not display the various levels of the judiciary to which requesters can go in 
some countries, e.g. there are three in Germany: the Administrative Court, the Higher 
Administrative Court, and the Federal Administrative Court. 
† This denotes an optional step; a requester can opt to skip this and start with the following step.  
‡ In India there are two routes of appeal, one of which requires an internal review before going to 
the oversight body, the other of which allows the requester to go straight to the oversight body. 
 
ATI IMPLEMENTATION PROBLEMS 
By passing an ATI law a government pledges to the public that more information will be available 
than before the legislation went into force. 10  This does not mean, however, that all requested 
information that should be disclosed will be disclosed, that requested information will be released 
within the stipulated timeframe, or that members of the public will even know the law exists. 
Scholarly work on ATI, which includes studies conducted in the U.S., U.K., India, Mexico, and 
China, reflects a growing awareness of implementation problems such as unjust withholding of 
information, significant delays in disclosure, and lack of awareness of the policy.11 Research has 
shown that most, if not all, countries that have put ATI legislation into force experience problems 
with their implementation, which Roberts divides into insufficient administrative capacity, access 
                                                          
10 Alasdair Roberts, “Dashed Expectations: Governmental Adaptation to Transparency Rules,” in Transparency: The Key to 
Better Governance?, ed. Christopher Hood and David Heald (Oxford: British Academy/Oxford University Press, 2006), 
107-125. 
11 Alasdair Roberts, “A Great and Revolutionary Law? The First Four Years of India’s Right to Information Act,” Public 
Administration Review 70, no. 6 (2010): 925-933. 
VOL. 2 JOURNAL OF INFORMATION POLICY 219 
 
 
 
barriers, and enforcement issues. 12  A selection of implementation problems in four select 
jurisdictions can be seen in Table 2 below.   
 
Table 2: ATI Implementation Problems in Four Select Jurisdictions13 
    Germany India Scotland Switzerland 
Pr
ob
le
m
s w
ith
 a
dm
in
is
tra
tiv
e 
ca
pa
ci
ty
 Lack of resources ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ 
Lack of leadership; bureaucratic culture of 
secrecy ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ 
Civil servants poorly trained to understand ATI 
policy and how to answer requests ✔* ✔ 
 ✔ 
Records management inadequate for locating 
information 
 ✔   
Crude (or non-existent) system for recording 
and keeping track of requests  
 ✔   
Ac
ce
ss
 b
ar
rie
rs
 
Refusal to accept requests, mute refusals, and 
overgenerous use of exemptions 
 ✔ ✔  
Delays in response and/or extensive backlog ✔ ✔ ✔  
High fees charged for making requests ✔    
Low awareness of the policy; lack of public 
understanding of how to make a request ✔ ✔ 
 ✔ 
* This was particularly a problem in the first two years after the law came into force. 
 
Insufficient administrative capacity encompasses two main implementation problems: a lack of 
resources allocated to ATI and inadequate leadership within administrative organizations on matters 
of compliance. These problems manifest themselves as inadequate records management systems and 
poor staff training – issues that, in turn, result in inappropriate handling of requests, delays in 
                                                          
12 Ibid. 
13 Sources for this table: interviews by authors; Democratic Republic of Germany, Activity Report on Freedom of Information: 
2006/2007 (Berlin: The Federal Commissioner for Data Protection and Freedom of Information, 2008); 
PriceWaterhouseCoopers, “Final Report: Understanding the Key Issues and Constraints in Implementing the RTI Act,” 
white paper, Delhi, India, June 2009; Eleanor Burt and John Taylor, The Freedom of Information [Scotland] Act 2002: New 
Modes of Information Management in Scottish Public Bodies? (Glasgow: University of St. Andrews and Glasgow Caledonian 
University, 2007); Martial Pasquier and Philomène Meilland, “Evaluation De La Loi Sur La Transparence,” white paper, 
Idheap (2009), accessed Oct. 1, 2012, http://www.edoeb.admin.ch/dokumentation/00652/01405/index.html?lang=fr; 
Sarah Holsen and Martial Pasquier, “The Swiss Federal Law on Transparency: Much Ado About Nothing?,” paper 
presented at the Fifth Transatlantic Dialogue, Washington DC, June 2009. 
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responding to requests, low awareness of the policy and lack of understanding of how to make a 
request, and high fees charged to requesters. 
A dearth of resources is one of the most commonly cited problems faced by ATI implementers and 
street-level bureaucrats – those who deal directly with members of the public. Without the necessary 
resources, staff members do not receive proper training in how to implement the policy, and the 
infrastructure necessary for answering requests is not put into place. Training and educating staff to 
understand the law is crucial because “bureaucratic knowledge of legal requirements is essential for 
implementation,” and it requires resources.14 Spending on new and/or improved infrastructure, such 
as records management and information systems through which information requests can be 
recorded and processed, makes it possible for street-level bureaucrats to locate the information that 
is requested from the public and coordinate efforts to answer a request. A lack of resources in these 
areas can result in a haphazard or delayed implementation. It is also crucial that funding for training 
and infrastructure continue to be allocated to ATI as the policy implementation evolves. If funding 
decreases to an insufficient level, new employees can be left untrained to comply with the law, thus 
leading to inconsistent compliance practices within the organization. 
Adequate resources are only part of the story, however; leadership and a bureaucratic culture that 
supports compliance are also important. As stated above, it is the implementers and policymakers 
who make decisions about resourcing, but they also set the tone for how much (or little) importance 
is placed on proper compliance with the law. Insufficient commitment to ATI compliance on the 
part of administrative officials due to the absence of a bureaucratic tradition of conforming with 
regulations, or a “deeply rooted history of secrecy,” can negatively affect implementation of the 
policy.15 Throughout implementation – from just after the law is passed to changes made as the 
implementation evolves – leadership must provide the basis from which the rest of the staff take 
their cues about how to deal with requests. The Information Commissioner of Canada, whose office 
assesses administrative offices’ compliance with the Access to Information Act on a regular basis, 
has found that “strong leadership [is] the most important factor for the successful operation of an 
access to information office.”16 Managers’ lack of commitment to proper compliance with the policy 
contributes to delays, backlogs, and negative attitudes about ATI among the staff – from 
indifference to hostility.17 In Scotland, the lack of administrative leadership on ATI implementation 
                                                          
14 Helen Darbishire and Thomas Carson, Transparency and Silence: A Survey of Access to Information Laws and Practices in 14 
Countries (New York: Open Society Institute, 2006), accessed Oct. 1, 2012, 
http://www.soros.org/sites/default/files/transparency_20060928.pdf; Suzanne J. Piotrowski, Yahong Zhang, Weiwei 
Lin, and Wenxuan Yu, “Key Issues for Implementation of Chinese Open Government Information Regulations,” Public 
Administration Review 69, no. S1 (2009): S129-S135.  
15 Laura Neuman, “Enforcement Models Content and Context,” Access to Information Working Paper Series 
(Washington D.C.: World Bank Institute, 2009), 13, accessed Oct. 1, 2012, 
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/EXTGOVACC/Resources/LNEumanATI.pdf; Laura Neuman, “Mechanisms for 
Monitoring and Enforcing the Right to Information Around the World,” in Access to Information: Building a Culture of 
Transparency (Atlanta: The Carter Center, 2006), 52, accessed Oct. 1, 2012, www.cartercenter.org/documents/2364.pdf. 
16 Canada, Office of the Information Commissioner, “Measuring Up: Improvements and Ongoing Concerns in Access 
to Information, 2008–2009 to 2010–2011,” Special Report to Parliament (May 2012), 11, accessed Oct. 1, 2012, 
http://www.oic-ci.gc.ca/eng/rp-pr_spe-rep_rap-spe_rep-car_fic-ren_measuring-up-etre-a-la-hauteur.aspx. 
17 Roberts, “A Great and Revolutionary Law?” 
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has been seen “as a crucial impediment to transforming… records management and information 
systems.”18 Moreover, if the staff are not supported or respected for their work on ATI, there could 
be “considerable turnover and a high burnout rate, because of the extremely tedious character of 
much of the work.”19 
Lack of resources and weak leadership lead to barriers to information access, which include poor 
handling of requests, delays and backlogs, inappropriate fees charged to requesters, and low 
awareness of the policy. Without proper training and incentive by management to release 
information as intended under the law, street-level bureaucrats may ignore requests outright, delay 
responding to them in favor of carrying out other tasks, apply exemptions over-generously, or 
charge inappropriate fees in order to dissuade requesters from pursuing their requests. In Mexico, 
the number of ATI requests that have been rejected due to “non-existent information” has risen 
since 2008 and the number of complaints filed with the ATI oversight body rose 30% between 2007 
and 2008, and another 30% the following year, because of an unsympathetic view toward 
transparency by the Calderón administration.20 Poor records management in Ireland has consistently 
hindered ATI request processing.21 Fees may either discourage a potential requester from making a 
request in the first place or push a requester to drop his request after he finds out how much he has 
to pay. In the first two years of implementation of the German federal ATI, the information 
commissioner identified three recurring fees issues: access contingent on the payment of an 
estimated (and often considerable) sum; notification that access would likely cost a great deal, 
followed by a question to the requester about whether he/she wants to follow through with the 
request; and large fees based unfairly on the administrator’s hourly salary rate multiplied by the 
amount of time needed to prepare the information.22 The commissioner pointed out that these 
practices had the effect of dissuading requesters from following through with their requests or from 
making them in the first place. The Slovenian Information Commissioner has remarked in her last 
three annual reports that public authorities have been charging high fees for access to information, 
which she suspects they do to reduce the number of requests and which she has warned them to 
stop doing.23    
Insufficient administrative capacity can also lead to low awareness of the ATI law and a lack of 
understanding on the part of the public about how the request process works. Awareness of the law 
is key to usage. Without knowing that they have the right to obtain information from the 
                                                          
18 Burt and Taylor, 75. 
19 David H. Flaherty, “Managing Response Times Under Canadian Access to Information Legislation,” Government of 
Canada: Access to Information Review Task Force (2002), accessed Oct. 1, 2012, http://www.atirtf-geai.gc.ca/paper-
responsetimes1-e.html. 
20 Zachary Bookman and Juan-Pablo Guerrero Amparán, “Two Steps Forward, One Step Back: Assessing the 
Implementation of Mexico’s Freedom of Information Act,” Mexican Law Review 1, no. 2 (2009): 49. 
21 Emily O’Reilly, “Freedom of Information: The First Decade,” speech at the 10th Anniversary Conference of Freedom 
of Information in Ireland (Dublin, May 15, 2008), accessed Oct. 1, 2012, 
http://www.oic.gov.ie/en/MediaandSpeeches/Speeches/2008/Name,8400,en.htm. 
22 Democratic Republic of Germany, 18-19. 
23 Information Commissioner of the Republic of Slovenia, Annual Report 2010 (Ljubljana: Information Commissioner of 
the Republic of Slovenia, June 2011), accessed Oct. 1, 2012, https://www.ip-
rs.si/fileadmin/user_upload/Pdf/porocila/Annual_Report_2010.pdf. 
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government, people are unlikely to make requests. As indicated by Hubbard, a lack of public 
awareness leads to “a low number of information requests even in countries with a long history of 
freedom of information laws.”24 The number of ATI requests made in Switzerland and Germany 
since those countries’ laws went into force in 2006, for example, is miniscule in comparison to other 
jurisdictions, which is attributed in part to presumably low public awareness of the policies.25   
 
ENFORCEMENT OF ATI 
Proper enforcement of the policy by an external body is crucial to overcoming – or even preventing 
– these implementation challenges. Pearlman argues that “the most liberal [ATI] laws are essentially 
useless if there’s no practical means of enforcing them.”26 An enforcement body is essential to the 
life of an ATI law because “if there is widespread belief that the legislation will not be enforced, this 
so-called right to information becomes meaningless;” without strong enforcement, it would be easy 
for the administration to deny information requests or ignore the law altogether.27 
There are four main types of bodies independent of government that resolve information requesters’ 
complaints under ATI – an ombudsman’s office, a commission’s/commissioner’s office, a tribunal, 
and a court.28 Of the roughly 90 countries that had passed an ATI law by 2011, approximately one-
third had given enforcement responsibility to an information commission or commissioner, less 
than one-third to an ombudsman, and the remainder to a tribunal, the courts, or an administrative 
office.29  
The main advantage of giving enforcement responsibility to an oversight body (an ombudsman or 
information commissioner) is that appealing to an oversight body is not as time-consuming, costly, 
or intimidating for requesters when compared to going to court.30 In their examination of alternative 
means of ATI enforcement in South Africa, where until now information requesters could only 
appeal to the courts about poor compliance or non-compliance, Allan and Currie concluded that 
                                                          
24 Quoted in Piotrowski et al., 133. 
25 Sarah Holsen and Martial Pasquier, “What’s Wrong with This Picture? The Case of Access to Information Requests in 
Two Continental Federal States – Germany and Switzerland,” Public Policy and Administration 27, no. 4 (2012): 283-301. 
26 Mitchell W. Pearlman, Piercing the Veil of Secrecy: Lessons in the Fight for Freedom of Information, 1st ed. (New Britain, CT: 
LawFirst Publishing/Connecticut Bar Association, 2010), 130. 
27 John M. Ackerman and Irma E. Sandoval-Ballesteros, “The Global Explosion of Freedom of Information Laws,” 
Administrative Law Review 58, no. 1 (2006): 105; Neuman, “Access to Information Laws: Pieces of the Puzzle,” 10. 
28 A tribunal is a specialized court. Rowat defines tribunals as “court-like bodies that deal with all types of appeals against 
administrative decisions… [similar to] the ombudsman.” See Donald C. Rowat, “Freedom of Information: The Appeal 
Bodies Under the Access Laws in Canada, Australia and New Zealand,” Australian Journal of Public Administration 52, no. 2 
(1993): 217. Since tribunals are in the clear minority when it comes to ATI enforcement bodies, they are only mentioned 
briefly here. 
29 McIntosh; Vleugels; Access Info Europe and Centre for Law and Democracy; Open Society Justice Initiative. 
30 Kate Allan and Iain Currie, “Enforcing Access to Information and Privacy Rights: Evaluating Proposals for an 
Information Protection Regulator for South Africa,” South African Journal on Human Rights 23, no. 3 (2007): 563-579; 
Harry Hammitt, Mediation Without Litigation: The FOI Reports (National Freedom of Information Coalition, 2007); 
Ackerman and Sandoval-Ballesteros; Miriam Nisbet, Testimony Before the Senate Subcommittee on Information Policy, 
Census, and National Archives, Washington D.C., Mar. 18, 2010, accessed Oct. 1, 2012, 
http://judiciary.senate.gov/pdf/09-09-30%20Nisbet%20Testimony.pdf. 
VOL. 2 JOURNAL OF INFORMATION POLICY 223 
 
 
 
“litigation is self-evidently too inaccessible and cumbersome to be an effective means to enforce the 
freedom of information rights.”31 Before the passage of the ATI Act in Canada, people who were 
unable to get the information they needed from government could take their case to the Federal 
Court of Canada but, once there, they faced “an onerous and frustrating and expensive process.”32 
Prior to the establishment of the United States Office of Government Information Services in 2009, 
which carries out an ombudsman function mediating complaints concerning compliance with the 
Freedom of Information Act, appeals went “to the ordinary courts, a process which is costly, 
cumbersome and slow.”33 
The key role that oversight bodies play in implementation is that of resolving information 
requesters’ complaints about procedural issues and/or handling appeals against the withholding of 
information in a fair and nonpartisan manner.34 However, some oversight bodies also play a range of 
crucial secondary roles in the implementation of ATI policies, which include providing support to 
the administration, offering their expertise to both requesters and the administration, and 
monitoring implementation. 35  Fulfilling these roles is essential to alleviating implementation 
problems on the part of the administration. These are discussed in more depth in the following 
section. 
 
THE INFORMATION COMMISSIONER  
The establishment of an information commissioner as enforcer of an ATI policy is a relatively recent 
development, one that stemmed from the ombudsman tradition: like the ombudsman, the 
information commissioner’s primary role is to resolve complaints from citizens about poor 
compliance or non-compliance on the part of the administration. However, the “general purposes of 
each institution are different” – whereas ombudsmen handle a variety of complaints of illegal or 
unjust administration, information commissioners deal with complaints related specifically to 
compliance with ATI (and in some cases, other information-related) policy.36 Two of the advantages 
of having a specialist body enforce an ATI policy are that the organization’s staff become experts in 
the area of access to information and can therefore provide “more consistent interpretations and 
rulings” as well as the fact that they are not distracted by other duties, as ombudsmen – who often 
deal with a host of other issues in addition to ATI – can be.37 
                                                          
31 Allan and Currie, 570. 
32 Government of Canada, The Access to Information Act: 10 Years On (Ottawa: The Information Commissioner of Canada, 
1994). 
33 Rowat, 215. 
34 Helen Darbishire, Information Commissioner/s: Comparative Review of Access to Information Oversight Bodies (Access Info 
Europe, Nov. 15, 2007), 5. 
35 Mendel, 154. 
36 Personal communication with Linda Reif, International Ombudsman Institute, Nov. 14, 2008. 
37 Mendel, 151; Megan Carter and Yanbin Lv, “Access to Government Information in Europe and China: What Lessons 
to Be Learned?” white paper, EU-China Information Society Project (2007), 35; Darbishire, 3. 
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The first ATI oversight body given the title of information commissioner was the Canadian Federal 
Office of the Information Commissioner, set up under the Canadian Access to Information Act in 
1983. While nearly all of the ATI policies passed before the Canadian law gave responsibility for 
resolving requesters’ complaints to an already established ombudsman, a growing trend in the last 
ten to twenty years has been to create an information commissioner office to function as the ATI 
oversight body. There are now roughly 30 information commissioners worldwide at the 
federal/central government level and more at the state/province level. In 2010 the Australian 
government switched from the ombudsman model to that of an information commissioner with the 
passage of reforms to the country’s ATI law and the Australian Information Commissioner Act of 
2010. The South African government is considering a similar change. 
There are two information commissioner models: an office headed by one commissioner (e.g. 
Canada, Slovenia, Scotland, Ireland, Australia, Switzerland, United Kingdom, and Germany), and a 
commission consisting of several commissioners (e.g. Mexico and India); the former model is more 
common. While Rowat argues that the plural commissioner model is the stronger of the two 
because it can help eliminate the risk of error or bias made on the part of one person, having 
multiple commissioners can also make appeal resolution more complicated if all commissioners 
must agree on a decision before it is issued, or uneven if the commissioners take radically different 
approaches to the same kinds of issues.38   
Functions 
Resolving appeals is each oversight body’s primary responsibility and generally consists of two main 
stages. First, many information commissioners try to settle information requesters’ appeals in an 
informal way and find a solution before taking an appeal to a more formal level.39 The step of 
informally settling an appeal may be specifically mentioned in the ATI law, as it is in Scotland, or it 
may simply be the first stage an information commissioner’s office has decided to adopt in the 
appeal resolution process. It can involve either person-to-person meetings with one or both parties 
(the requester and the administration) or communication via phone and written correspondence. 
The U.K. Information Commissioner’s Office closed over half of the 3,374 appeals it received in 
2009-2010 before they reached the stage of formal investigation, while the Irish Information 
Commissioner settled 28% of the 301 cases that arrived at her office in 2010.40  
If an appeal case is not settled informally, the oversight body commences a formal process. This can 
take one of two main forms: an investigation by the oversight body’s staff (more common) or a 
meeting to which the parties to the appeal are invited. During an investigation the commissioner’s 
staff asks the relevant administrative office for its reasons for refusing to disclose the information 
and to see the documents in question. They may also contact any third parties that could be affected 
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by the disclosure of the information and ask the requester for further comments or information 
regarding their complaint. After weighing the different views and evidence, the oversight body then 
makes a recommendation to the administration about the case (whether to disclose in full or in part 
or to withhold) or issues a binding decision to which the administration is obliged to adhere. (See 
the Powers section below for more about the difference between recommendations and binding 
decisions.) 
There are also oversight bodies that resolve appeals by holding a mediation or hearing to which the 
requester and administrative official are invited. In Switzerland if the staff of the commissioner’s 
office does not resolve the appeal informally, they schedule a meeting with both parties at their 
office and play the role of mediator, trying to facilitate a mutually satisfactory solution to the 
problem the requester has raised in his/her appeal. If the parties to do not come to an agreement, 
however, the commissioner is required to write a recommendation for the case. Members of the 
Indian Central Information Commission, in contrast, hold hearings at which the requester and 
administrative official give their points of view on the case, and the commissioner passes a judgment 
and issues a written decision at the conclusion of the hearing or shortly thereafter. 
In addition to reviewing and resolving appeals, most commissioners are required by law to carry out 
one or more of the following functions: 
1) Advise and assist people who have questions about using the ATI law and/or specific 
questions about making an appeal; 
2) Advise and assist administrative officials with questions on compliance and/or specific 
ATI requests or appeal cases;  
3) Assess the administration’s compliance with the policy; 
4) Compile and report their performance on a regular (usually annual) basis; 
5) Give advice on reform of the ATI law and/or on how the ATI law can affect or be 
affected by other (including proposed) legislation; 
6) Promote and raise awareness of the law.41 
Many oversight bodies are responsible for providing the administration with advice and assistance 
on understanding and complying with the ATI law. This help can take one of several forms. First, 
oversight bodies may be required to advise and assist administrative officials who have general 
questions about compliance with the policy or specific queries about “live” cases with which they are 
dealing. Second, they may be instructed by law to publish guidance for the administration that 
clarifies and simplifies compliance activities such as establishing best practices in records 
management, interpreting exemptions, charging fees, and applying the public interest or harm test. 
Third, they may be consulted by administrative bodies and/or the legislature on the effect of the 
ATI law on pending legislation, e.g. e-governance or public participation, or on proposed 
amendments to the ATI law. 42  A fourth form of advice and assistance is encouraging the 
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administration to undertake proactive information disclosure activities. The Irish ATI law, for 
example, requires the commissioner to “foster and encourage the publication by public bodies, in 
addition to the publications provided for by sections 15 and 16, of information of relevance or 
interest to the general public in relation to their activities and functions generally.” 43 Both the 
Scottish and U.K. ATI laws stipulate that the commissioner assess and approve administrative 
offices’ publication schemes, which are lists of all categories of information already made available 
by the authorities on their website and/or in paper form. The Indian Central Information 
Commission has taken it upon itself to strongly support the administration’s compliance with 
Section 4 of the Right to Information Act, which requires central government organizations to 
organize their documents in a way that makes them easily accessible to staff answering information 
requests and to publish certain categories of information proactively. 
In some jurisdictions, the information commissioner is required to take a step beyond aiding and 
assisting the administration with compliance, and monitor and/or assess how well administrative 
offices comply with the legislation. In Germany, for example, the commissioner “shall monitor 
compliance by public bodies of the Federation with this Act,” which it does by carrying out on-site 
assessments of the bodies’ responses to information requests and other processes involved in 
compliance. 44  The U.K. Information Commissioner, while not mandated to assess compliance, 
“may, with the consent of any public authority, assess whether that authority is following good 
practice,”45 whereas the Australian commissioner is responsible for “monitoring, investigating and 
reporting on compliance by agencies with the Freedom of Information Act 1982.”46 
Many oversight bodies are also required to help members of the public understand and use their 
ATI law. As with the administration, there are different ways to assist requesters and potential 
requesters. First, the oversight body can offer people advice on how to make a request and what to 
do if the decision on an appeal is not made in the requester’s favor. This assistance can take the 
form of verbal communication as well as printed brochures or information placed on the oversight 
body’s website. Second, the oversight body might be given the task of promoting the law in order to 
raise awareness amongst the public of their right to information, as is the case in Scotland.  
Going hand-in-hand with promoting the law is the expectation on the part of many that an 
information commissioner will champion transparency as part of his/her job. Indeed, many 
commissioners and external experts believe that “an important function of the information 
commissioner is to create a ‘culture of transparency’ within the public administration.”47 The newly-
created Office of the Australian Information Commissioner is considered, “in essence, an 
information champion, with a comprehensive range of powers and functions to promote open 
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45 United Kingdom, Freedom of Information Act (2000). 
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government…”48 The Irish Information Commissioner stated in a speech to fellow commissioners 
in 2011 that she is “charged by the [legislature] to (amongst other things) champion the cause of 
FOI and to seek to ensure that our FOI regime actually achieves its objectives.”49 The Canadian 
Information Commissioner lists “champion[ing] increased government transparency and the 
implementation of open government standards” as one the high level activities that are part of the 
organization’s 2011-2014 strategic plan. 50 In the first part of its mission statement, the Mexican 
Federal Institute of Access to Information and Data Protection emphasizes “the importance of 
guaranteeing access to government public information.”51 
In addition to the above duties, virtually all information commissioners must report to the 
jurisdiction’s legislative body on an annual basis (bi-annual in the case of the German Information 
Commissioner). The requisite level of detail to be included in the reports ranges, however, from 
“data on previous year’s activities as well as estimates and recommendations in the area of… access 
to public information” in the case of the Slovenian Information Commissioner Act, to “the number 
of requests for access to information filed with each department and agency; the results obtained; 
the time of reply; the number and results of the matters brought to the Institute; the status of the 
claims filed before the control internal bodies as well as the difficulties encountered to enforce the 
Act,” as stipulated in the Mexican Federal Law of Transparency and Access to Public Government 
Information. 52 These reports function not only as a means to keep the government and public 
abreast of developments in the law’s implementation but also to hold the oversight body 
accountable to the bodies it serves. 
Powers 
The powers granted to oversight bodies by law assist them in carrying out their functions. Common 
across all ten information commissioners listed in Table 3 (displayed at the end of the article) is the 
right to access any information and/or documents relevant to an appeal case. This ensures that the 
commissioner(s) and staff have at hand all the necessary information for making a judgment, writing 
a recommendation, or contributing to mediation. This power is essential to well-crafted responses to 
appeals; most debates concerning oversight bodies’ powers center instead on whether or not they 
should have the legal right to issue legally binding orders. 53  Whereas some information 
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commissioners possess only the power to recommend to the administration a course of action 
regarding an appeal case, many information commissioners can issue binding decisions. 
The sanctions that can be imposed on an administrative office for failing to comply with a binding 
decision differ across jurisdictions. In the United Kingdom, failure by an administrative office to 
comply with a decision notice issued by the Information Commissioner’s Office (ICO) places it in a 
position to be held in contempt of court. This means that the ICO can turn over the case to the 
court, which can then look into the matter and make a finding.54 The same holds true in Scotland. In 
Slovenia, however, if an administrative office refuses to comply with the information 
commissioner’s decision, the office can face a fine of roughly €400-1000 for the legal violation 
(although the commissioner had not yet done this as of 2007). 55  Similarly the Indian Central 
Information Commission may fine administrative officials personally for non-compliance with 
Section 20[1] of that country’s Right to Information Act.56   
The general consensus in the ATI community is that an oversight body should be granted binding 
decision power. The push for granting oversight bodies with binding decision power in ATI laws 
has been fueled by increasingly established international standards in ATI provisions and lobbying 
by civil society organizations. 57 The two main arguments for giving an oversight body binding 
decision power are: 1) that it gives the body “teeth” to force disclosure of information when the 
administration is reluctant to do so; and 2) its decisions become official legal precedents to which 
the administration and oversight body staff can refer when dealing with similar requests and appeals. 
On the flip side is the argument that oversight bodies without binding decision power – those that 
can only issue recommendations – are as effective as their peers who have that power. Neuman 
highlights the fact that a soft approach to appeal resolution can be less intimidating to information 
requesters; faster, since it limits investigations to “unsworn representations;” and less adversarial, 
“potentially leading to greater compliance” than the formal approach of issuing binding decisions.58 
McIsaac, in arguing that the Canadian Information Commissioner would benefit from having the 
power, also acknowledges that the commissioner’s current recommendation-only model works well 
because of its focus on negotiation, low cost, and the fact that current and past commissioners 
support it.59 
Whether mediation or investigation, recommendation or binding decision, the outcome of an 
information commissioner appeal case can significantly impact whether information is released. 
Some of the Scottish Information Commissioner’s case decisions have been groundbreaking, 
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including one that resulted in the release of patient mortality rates of individual heart surgeons in 
Scotland, a category of information that had not been released in any country prior.60 Another ruling 
by the Scottish Information Commissioner resulted in disclosure of information to a group that 
campaigns to keep rural public schools open; when the local council refused to give the requesters 
some of the information they wanted, they took their case to the commissioner who agreed that 
most of it should be released. This decision impacted Scottish public policy more broadly when 
members of the group who were concurrently consulting with Parliament about a new education-
related bill convinced lawmakers to include a clause to guarantee access to certain information 
during school closure consultations.61 
In Germany, a federal government department twice rejected a journalist’s request for information 
regarding the government’s anti-corruption policy. However, when he took his case to the German 
Federal Commissioner for Data Protection and Freedom of Information, the commissioner formed 
the opinion that the department decision makers were wrong in arguing that release would 
compromise the government’s anti-corruption strategy. The commissioner’s opinion, delivered to 
the department’s minister, had enough weight to result in the release of the information.62 In a case 
that made world headlines, the publication of Members of Parliaments’ expenses in the U.K. in 2009 
was in part a result of the Information Commissioner’s Office (ICO) decision on several ATI 
requests for the information that some of it should be released. Another ruling by the ICO for 
disclosure of Cabinet Office meeting minutes about the Attorney General’s advice on military action 
in Iraq in 2003, however, was ultimately struck down by ministerial veto in 2009, the first time this 
power had been used. The case, however, was heavily publicized by a media highly critical of the 
minister’s use of the veto.63 
Independence 
Nearly all scholarly work on ATI oversight bodies prefaces the term “enforcement body” with the 
word “independent,” as if it were a pre-condition of the organization’s existence, but few scholars 
explain what constitutes independence. It is common consensus, however, that two types of 
independence exist: formal and informal. Formal – or de jure – independence is that which an 
organization possesses according to the law.64 It consists of the conditions of the oversight body’s 
existence such as the length of an oversight body director’s tenure, who funds the oversight body, 
and who has control over the hiring of the oversight body’s staff. Formal independence is important 
to politicians because the factors of which it consists give them control over the regulator; that is, it 
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sets guidelines for removing the head of a regulating body.65 Conversely, it matters to the regulators 
because it provides legal protection, for example, from arbitrary dismissal when they issue an 
unpopular decision or recommendation. 
In contrast, informal – or de facto – independence describes the autonomy an institution has in its 
day-to-day functioning. Informal independence has been described by Maggetti as “self-
determination of agencies’ preferences, and their autonomy during the activity of regulation.”66 In 
essence informal independence is independence in practice, rather than in law, and includes such 
dimensions as resourcing (does the oversight body have the budget and staff it needs to carry out its 
mandate?) and leadership (how does the head of the oversight body use discretion?). 
The dimensions used to measure regulatory bodies’ formal independence give insight into the 
aspects that scholars consider important. Gilardi identified five main categories in his measurement 
of the formal independence of Independent Regulatory Agencies (IRAs) in 17 European countries: 
“the status of the head of the regulator, the status of its management board, the relationship with 
government and parliament, financial autonomy, and the extent of regulatory powers.”67 Little has 
been written on the essential components of ATI oversight bodies’ independence, however.  
Mendel argues that the process of appointing the commissioner or ombudsman is central to 
guaranteeing independence and lists three additional provisions in ATI laws that strengthen 
independence: requiring certain characteristics of the director(s) of an oversight body, e.g. expertise 
in the subject of ATI, a positive moral reputation, and no significant political links; protecting the 
head of the oversight body from indiscriminate dismissal; and ensuring that staff salaries are linked 
to administration salary grades.68 Neuman adds to this by explaining that the appointments process 
is crucial to independence because trust in the legitimacy of the body depends on whether or not the 
leader has been selected for appointment for political reasons. She goes on to argue in favor of a 
reasonable limit for the oversight body director’s term in office (too long a term could allow the 
person and his staff to become complacent and uninterested in changes taking place in the 
administration, too short with an option for renewal could lead to currying favor with those who 
decide whether to keep the person in post for another term); protection from arbitrary dismissal; 
and budget sovereignty, i.e. no requirement for part of the executive branch to submit and gain 
budget approval from the legislature.69 These factors are crucial to independence. 
Combining Gilardi’s measurement dimensions and those identified by Mendel and Neuman, five key 
aspects of information commissioners’ formal independence are identified and included in Table 3: 
whether the independence of the body is explicitly granted by law; appointment of the 
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commissioner(s); length of a commissioner’s term; dismissal of the commissioner(s); and who funds 
the oversight body. In seven of the ten cases, the law guarantees independence by stating that “the 
Commissioner shall be independent in the performance of his or her functions” 70  or “the 
Information Commissioner is an autonomous and independent state body.” 71  Nearly all 
commissioners are appointed by a combination of legislative and executive officials in government, 
in some cases on the recommendation of the administration. All have between four and seven years 
in the job; some can have their post renewed, others not. Only the Swiss commissioner may remain 
in the post indefinitely. Dismissal is universally allowed only if the commissioner is found guilty of 
misbehavior or incapacity to hold office. Funding, however, is a more complex issue. While for all 
bodies the legislature is responsible for ruling on the administration’s budget, some commissioners’ 
budgets are part of a specific administrative office (India, Germany, U.K.) while for others the 
commissioner can count on near autonomy in deciding the budget (Scotland, Slovenia, Mexico). 
Effectiveness of the Information Commissioner Model? 
So is the information commissioner model an effective one for the enforcement of ATI policies? As 
it is not the focus of this article to compare the information commissioner model to the 
ombudsman or court-based complaint resolution process, it cannot answer whether the information 
commissioner is the best of the three main enforcement models that exist; however, some 
conclusions about whether it is a strong option for ATI enforcement can be drawn from the 
information provided above. 
First, one must decide what the overall goal of the body is. Even if it is only to resolve appeals and 
complaints, the information commissioner is a good option in comparison to the courts and 
ombudsman simply because the commissioner’s office focuses only on information-related cases. 
This means that the information commissioner and his/her staff are specialists on the topic of 
information access and, therefore, their level of knowledge about the law and the issues surrounding 
it are higher than a generalist ombudsman or court. However, if the aim is to give the enforcement 
body more responsibilities than just resolving cases, the information commissioner model is clearly 
superior to those of the ombudsman and court because nearly all commissioners carry out additional 
functions in line with increasing transparency, including educating the administration and the public 
about the policy, providing information about the law’s application, and, in many cases, promoting 
the law. Of course, whether the commissioner can successfully carry out these tasks depends on his 
level of independence and resourcing (see below). 
While it is generally true that appealing to an information commissioner is less expensive and 
intimidating than taking a case to court, it is not always free. In Ireland, for example, one must pay 
up to €150 to appeal to the commissioner. 72  Moreover, the argument that the information 
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commissioner resolves cases faster than a court only holds if the commissioner’s office is sufficiently 
resourced to efficiently handle his/her caseload. In a country where demand for information is high 
and appeals pile up on the desks of the commissioner and his/her staff, the case completion time 
could grow to a level that discourages information seekers from using the enforcement service.  
In a study based on a descriptive statistical analysis of the U.K. Information Commissioner’s case 
log, the Campaign for Freedom of Information found that the severe delays in the Information 
Commissioner’s Office investigations of appeal cases “undermine the FOI Act’s effectiveness and 
public confidence in it” because: 
• The information requested may no longer be of help if/when it is finally released; 
• Requesters waiting a long time for the resolution of their case could become discouraged 
from making other requests; 
• Similar mistakes could be made by administrators on other cases before an appeal 
decision is released; 
• Before a decision is made, other requesters might make similar complaints, which serves 
to increase the oversight body’s workload even more; 
• The administration may reason that delays by the oversight body mean that they can 
withhold information for a longer period of time because an appeal would take so long 
anyway.73 
Finally, the information commissioner must enjoy autonomy and independence in order to 
confidently carry out his/her functions. This requires sufficient resourcing, administrative distance 
from the government, and the capacity to decide the use of the funds granted by government. 
Without these the commissioner almost necessarily has to choose among the tasks assigned to him 
and sacrifice the least pressing to, for example, case adjudication. 
For a government considering whether to set up an information commissioner’s office or give 
responsibility for ATI enforcement to an already established ombudsman’s office, there are two 
additional points to consider. The first is effort and cost – it is simpler and less expensive to hand 
over additional responsibilities to an ombudsman that already has the infrastructure in place and 
staff at hand (although more employees might be needed) than it is to open a new institution. 
Second, while people may be familiar with the ombudsman and what he/she does, they will not 
know about the information commissioner until/unless there is publicity about his/her office and 
the functions the office carries out. This means that it might take a while for people to become 
familiar with the institution that provides the resolution service and their rights to appeal. However, 
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in a country like Mexico, the fact that the IFAI was a brand new organization has contributed to its 
high level of integrity precisely because it had no past – and no negative legacy.74 
 
CONCLUSIONS 
Access to information laws are proliferating worldwide. With at least 90 laws in force at the national 
level, ATI is increasingly mentioned as an important means of increasing transparency and 
accountability and thereby strengthening relations between citizens and the state. However, policy 
implementation problems can hinder the achievement of these objectives. 
The oversight body is an essential component of ATI law enforcement because it contributes to the 
solution of implementation problems. The primary function oversight bodies play is to resolve 
appeals and complaints made by information requesters when information is withheld from them or 
they face other issues of non-compliance on the part of the administration. Information 
commissioners, a type of oversight body specifically dedicated to the enforcement of ATI policies, 
must also fulfill obligations such as providing advice and assistance to administrative officials and 
information requesters, monitoring the administration’s compliance with ATI, compiling and 
reporting statistics on use of ATI and the appeals they receive, and promoting the law to the public. 
By carrying out these tasks, information commissioners and their staffs can be especially helpful in 
combatting issues such as poor compliance training, delays and refusals to disclose information, and 
low public awareness of the policy. 
An information commissioner’s effectiveness in fulfilling his/her role depends in part on the powers 
it has at its disposal and the independence it is granted by law and in practice. Many experts on ATI 
argue that an oversight body should have the power to issue binding decisions because it allows the 
organization to “push the envelope” by requiring – rather than merely suggesting – an administrative 
office’s disclosure of information when it would prefer to withhold. The body of case law that 
develops as binding decisions are issued can also be helpful to appellants and administrative officials 
dealing with similar cases. However, a strong argument for the effectiveness of “soft” negotiations 
through recommendations has also been made. 
An information commissioner’s level of independence is understood to be important to the body’s 
ability to operate autonomously and fairly. The extent of an oversight body’s independence is 
difficult to measure, especially when discussing independence in practice. However, there is some 
consensus on the importance of a rigorous appointment process, absence of indiscriminate dismissal 
clauses, and a commissioner’s control over the organization’s finances. More needs to be explored 
on this topic in order to make solid suggestions for changes to existing laws or drafts of newly 
conceived legislation. 
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When considering whether to adopt the information commissioner model for enforcement of an 
ATI law, a government must consider several factors. First, what exactly does the government want 
the oversight body to do: solely mediate disputes or take on a broader role of educator, assessor, and 
promoter of the law? Second, which powers will the oversight body be granted? Third, which 
safeguards for the oversight body’s independence will be included in the law, taking into 
consideration how these might work in practice? And finally, how many resources is the government 
willing to commit to the organization’s work? The answers to these questions will ultimately add up 
to the potential effectiveness of the institution. 
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Table 3: Details on Ten Information Commissioners 
 Australia Canada Germany India Ireland 
Name of ATI law 
Freedom of 
Information Act, 
1982 
Access to 
Information Act 
Federal Act 
Governing Access 
to Information 
held by the 
Federal 
Government 
Right to 
Information Act, 
2005 
Freedom of 
Information Act 
Coverage of law Federal organizations only 
Federal 
organizations only 
Federal 
organizations only 
All government 
organizations; 
Central 
Information 
Commission takes 
appeals on 
requests to central 
level only 
All levels of 
government 
Year law in force 1982 1983 2006 2005 1998 
Title of oversight body 
Office of the 
Australian 
Information 
Commissioner 
Office of the 
Information 
Commissioner of 
Canada 
Federal Data 
Protection and 
Information 
Commissioner 
Central 
Information 
Commission 
Office of the 
Information 
Commissioner 
Year oversight body established 2010 1983 2006 2005 1997 
Responsible for other laws? 
Privacy and 
information policy 
more generally 
No 
Data protection, 
Environmental 
Information 
Regulations 
No 
Ombudsman; 
Environmental 
Information 
Regulations 
Appeal resolution method 
Case settlement or 
written decision; 
occasional 
hearings 
Investigation and 
mediation Case opinion 
Case decision 
following hearing Case decision 
Fu
nc
tio
ns
 
Advise and assist requesters ✔     
Advise and assist administration ✔  ✔   
Monitor and/or assess compliance 
by administration ✔  ✔  ✔ 
Report to legislature/public ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ 
Advise on related 
legislation/amendments to law ✔     
Promote ATI ✔     
Po
w
er
s 
Binding decision power ✔   ✔ ✔ 
Access to any information and/or 
documents relevant to procedure 
of mediation 
✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ 
May impose a fine on civil servants 
for non-compliance    ✔ ✔ 
Co
m
po
ne
nt
s o
f 
in
de
pe
nd
en
ce
 
Explicitly stated in law? No No Yes Yes Yes 
Commissioner appointed by Governor-General 
Governor in 
Council on 
approval by 
House of 
Commons and 
Senate joint 
resolution 
Bundestag 
following a 
proposal of the 
Federal 
Government 
By President on 
nomination of 
Prime Minister, 
Leader of the 
Opposition in the 
Lok Sabha, one 
Union Cabinet 
Minister 
President of 
Ireland on 
recommendation 
of each of the 
Houses of 
Oireachtas 
Length of appointment 5 years 7 years (renewable once) 
5 years (renewable 
once) 
5 years (non-
renewable) 
6 years (renewable 
once) 
VOL. 2 JOURNAL OF INFORMATION POLICY 236 
 
 
 
Dismissal For misbehavior or incapacity 
By the Governor 
in Council on 
address of Senate 
and House of 
Commons 
If grounds which 
would justify 
dismissal from 
service in the case 
of a judge with life 
tenure 
If the Supreme 
Court reports that 
he/she is guilty of 
misbehavior or 
incapacity 
Only for stated 
misbehavior, 
Incapacity, or 
bankruptcy 
Funding decided by Attorney-General's Office  
Federal 
Parliament 
Central 
Government  
 
 Mexico Scotland Slovenia Switzerland U.K. 
Name of ATI law 
Federal Law of 
Transparency and 
Access to Public 
Government 
Information 
Freedom of 
Information 
(Scotland) Act, 
2002 
Access to Public 
Information Act 
Federal Act on 
Freedom of 
Information in the 
Administration 
Freedom of 
Information Act, 
2000 
Coverage of law Federal organizations only 
Scottish public 
authorities 
All levels of 
government 
Federal 
organizations only 
All levels of 
government 
Year law in force 2003 2005 2003 2006 2005 
Title of oversight body 
Federal Institute 
for Access to 
Public 
Information 
Scottish 
Information 
Commissioner 
Inspectorate for 
Personal Data 
Protection and 
Commissioner for 
Access to Public 
Information 
Federal Data 
Protection and 
Information 
Commissioner 
Information 
Commissioner's 
Office 
Year oversight body established 2003 2003 2003 2006 2001 
Responsible for other laws? Privacy 
Environmental 
Information 
Regulations, 
Public Interest 
Disclosure Act 
1998 
Data protection, 
Re-use of Public 
Information, 
Public Media Act 
Data protection 
Data protection, 
Environmental 
Information 
Regulations 
Resolution of appeals Investigation and case decision Case decision Case decision 
Mediation (and 
written 
recommendation 
if necessary) 
Case decision 
Fu
nc
tio
ns
 
Advise and assist requesters ✔ ✔  ✔ ✔ 
Advise and assist administration ✔ ✔   ✔ 
Monitor and/or assess compliance 
by administration ✔ ✔   ✔ 
Report to legislature/public ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ 
Advise on related 
legislation/amendments to ATI law  ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ 
Promote ATI ✔ ✔   ✔ 
Po
w
er
s 
Binding decision power  ✔ ✔  ✔ 
Access to any information and/or 
documents relevant to procedure of 
mediation 
✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ 
May impose a fine on civil servants 
for non-compliance   ✔   
Co
m
po
ne
nt
s o
f 
in
de
pe
nd
en
ce
 
Explicitly stated in law? Yes Yes Yes Yes No 
Commissioner appointed by 
Executive Branch 
but can be vetoed 
by majority vote 
of Senate or 
Permanent 
Commission 
Formally 
appointed by the 
Queen on the 
nomination of the 
Scottish 
Parliament 
National 
Assembly of the 
Republic of 
Slovenia on 
proposal of the 
president of 
Republic of 
Slovenia 
Federal Council 
Commissioner 
appointed by 
Queen on 
nomination of 
Government 
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Length of appointment 6 years (non-renewable) 
6 years (non-
renewable) 
5 years (renewable 
once) 
4 years 
(indefinitely 
renewable) 
5 years (renewable 
once) 
Dismissal 
Only if violates 
Constitution or 
FOI law, when 
actions or failures 
to act affect 
Institute's 
prerogatives, or 
convicted of 
felony that merits 
imprisonment 
If believed that 
has breached the 
terms and 
conditions of 
office or 
Parliament decides 
it has lost 
confidence in the 
person’s ability to 
perform functions 
Only if convicted 
of a criminal 
offense followed 
by custodial 
sentence or in case 
of permanent loss 
of working 
abilities for 
performance of 
his function 
If violates duties 
or is unable to 
fulfill duties 
May be removed 
from office by 
Her Majesty in 
pursuance of an 
Address from 
both Houses of 
Parliament 
Funding decided by 
Budget prepared 
by Commission 
and presented to 
Secretariat of 
Treasury and 
Public Credit as 
part of Federation 
Budget 
Scottish 
Parliament 
National 
Assembly of the 
Republic of 
Slovenia on 
proposal of the 
Information 
Commissioner 
Federal Council Ministry of Justice 
 
  
VOL. 2 JOURNAL OF INFORMATION POLICY 238 
 
 
 
BIBLIOGRAPHY 
 
 
Access Info Europe and Centre for Law and Democracy. “Global Right to Information Rating 
Map,” Sept. 28, 2011. Accessed Oct. 1, 2012, http://www.rti-rating.org/index.html. 
Ackerman, John M. and Irma E. Sandoval-Ballesteros. “The Global Explosion of Freedom of 
Information Laws.” Administrative Law Review 58, no. 1 (2006): 85-130. 
Allan, Kate and Iain Currie. “Enforcing Access to Information and Privacy Rights: Evaluating 
Proposals for an Information Protection Regulator for South Africa.” South African Journal on 
Human Rights 23, no. 3 (2007): 563-579. 
Australia, Commonwealth of. “Secrecy Laws and Open Government in Australia” (ALRC Report 
112). Australian Law Reform Commission, Mar. 11, 2010. Accessed Oct. 1, 2012, 
http://www.alrc.gov.au/sites/default/files/pdfs/publications/ALRC112.pdf. 
Australia, Commonwealth of, Office of the Australian Information Commission. “Guide to the 
Freedom of Information Act 1982” (Nov. 2011). Accessed Oct. 1, 2012, 
http://www.oaic.gov.au/publications/agency_resources/guide_freedom_of_information_act_1
982.pdf. 
Banisar, David. “Freedom of Information Around the World 2006: A Global Survey of Access to 
Government Information Laws.” White paper, Privacy International (2006). Accessed Oct. 1, 
2012, http://www.freedominfo.org/documents/global_survey2006.pdf. 
Bookman, Zachary, and Juan-Pablo Guerrero Amparán. “Two Steps Forward, One Step Back: 
Assessing the Implementation of Mexico’s Freedom of Information Act.” Mexican Law Review 1, 
no. 2 (2009): 3-51. 
Burt, Eleanor and John Taylor. The Freedom of Information [Scotland] Act 2002: New Modes of Information 
Management in Scottish Public Bodies? Glasgow: University of St. Andrews and Glasgow Caledonian 
University, 2007. 
Caiden, Gerald E., Niall MacDermot, and Ake Sandler. “The Institution of Ombudsman.” In 
International Handbook of the Ombudsman: Evolution and Present Function, edited by Gerald E. Caiden, 
3-21. Westport, Connecticut: Greenwood Press, 1983. 
Canada, Government of. The Access to Information Act: 10 Years On. Ottawa: The Information 
Commissioner of Canada, 1994. 
Canada, Office of the Information Commissioner of. “Measuring Up: Improvements and Ongoing 
Concerns in Access to Information, 2008–2009 to 2010–2011.” Special Report to Parliament 
(May 2012). Accessed Oct. 1, 2012, http://www.oic-ci.gc.ca/eng/rp-pr_spe-rep_rap-spe_rep-
car_fic-ren_measuring-up-etre-a-la-hauteur.aspx. 
––––––. “OIC Strategic Plan 2011–2014” (2011).  Accessed Oct. 1, 2012, http://www.oic-
ci.gc.ca/eng/abu-ans_cor-inf-inf-cor-stategic-planning-plan-strategique_2011-
2014.aspx#f4f08fe5-7bc5-47ec-a78b-b2f54988789a. 
Carter, Megan and Yanbin Lv. “Access to Government Information in Europe and China: What 
Lessons to Be Learned?” White paper, EU-China Information Society Project, 2007. 
Darbishire, Helen. Information Commissioner/s: Comparative Review of Access to Information Oversight Bodies. 
Access Info Europe, Nov. 15, 2007. 
Darbishire, Helen and Thomas Carson. Transparency and Silence: A Survey of Access to Information Laws 
and Practices in 14 Countries. New York: Open Society Institute, 2006. Accessed Oct. 1, 2012, 
http://www.soros.org/sites/default/files/transparency_20060928.pdf. 
Flaherty, David H. “Managing Response Times Under Canadian Access to Information Legislation.” 
Government of Canada: Access to Information Review Task Force (2002). Accessed Oct. 1, 
2012, http://www.atirtf-geai.gc.ca/paper-responsetimes1-e.html. 
VOL. 2 JOURNAL OF INFORMATION POLICY 239 
 
 
 
Fox, Jonathan, and Libby Haight. “Mexico’s Transparency Reforms: Theory and Practice.” Research 
in Social Problems and Public Policy 19 (2011): 353-379. 
Frankel, Maurice and Katherine Gundersen. Delays in Investigating Freedom of Information Complaints. 
London: Campaign for Freedom of Information, 2009. 
Germany, Democratic Republic of. Activity Report on Freedom of Information: 2006/2007. Berlin: The 
Federal Commissioner for Data Protection and Freedom of Information, 2008. 
Gilardi, Fabrizio. “The Formal Independence of Regulators: A Comparison of 17 Countries and 17 
Sectors.” Swiss Political Science Review 11, no. 4 (2005): 139-167. 
Gilardi, Fabrizio and Martino Maggetti. “The Independence of Regulatory Authorities.” In Handbook 
on the Politics of Regulation, edited by David Levi-Faur, 201-214. Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar 
Publishing, 2011. 
Hammitt, Harry. Mediation Without Litigation: The FOI Reports. National Freedom of Information 
Coalition, 2007. 
Hanretty, Chris and Christel Koop. “Measuring the Formal Independence of Regulatory Agencies.” 
Journal of European Public Policy 19, no. 2 (2012): 198-216. 
Hazell, Robert, Benjamin Worthy, and Mark Glover. The Impact of the Freedom of Information Act on 
Central Government in the UK Does FOI Work? Hampshire, UK: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010. 
Holsen, Sarah and Martial Pasquier. “The Swiss Federal Law on Transparency: Much Ado About 
Nothing?” Paper presented at the Fifth Transatlantic Dialogue, Washington DC, June 2009. 
––––––. “What’s Wrong with This Picture? The Case of Access to Information Requests in Two 
Continental Federal States – Germany and Switzerland.” Public Policy and Administration 27, no. 4 
(2012): 283-301. 
Hood, Christopher. “Transparency in Historical Perspective.” In Transparency: The Key to Better 
Governance?, edited by Christopher Hood and David Heald, 3-23. Oxford: British 
Academy/Oxford University Press, 2006. 
Ireland, Office of the Information Commissioner of the Republic of. Annual Report 2010.  Dublin: 
Government of Ireland, May 2011. Accessed Oct. 1, 2012, 
http://www.oic.gov.ie/en/Publications/AnnualReports/AnnualReport2010/online/index.html. 
––––––. “Fees for Review by the Commissioner, Office of the Information Commissioner,” 
(unknown date). Accessed Oct. 1, 2012, 
http://www.oic.gov.ie/en/ReviewbytheCommissioner/HowtoApplyforaReviewbytheCommissi
oner/FeesforReviewbytheCommissioner/#d.en.201. 
Maggetti, Martino. “De Facto Independence After Delegation: A Fuzzy‐Set Analysis.” Regulation & 
Governance 1, no. 4 (2007): 271-294. 
McIntosh, Toby. “FOI Laws: Counts Vary Depending on Definitions.” Freedominfo.org, Oct. 28, 
2011. Accessed Oct. 1, 2012, http://www.freedominfo.org/2011/10/foi-laws-counts-vary-
slightly-depending-on-definitions/. 
McIsaac, Barbara A., Q.C. “The Information Commissioner Investigative Powers and Procedures.” 
Government of Canada: Access to Information Review Task Force (May 2002). Accessed Oct. 
19, 2012, http://www.atirtf-geai.gc.ca/paper-investigation1exec-e.html. 
Mendel, Toby. Freedom of Information: A Comparative Legal Survey, 2nd Ed. Paris: UNESCO, 2008. 
Mexico, Instituto Federal de Acceso a la Información y Protección de Datos. “IFAI: Misión, Visión, 
Objetivos” (unknown date). Accessed Oct. 1, 2012, 
http://www.ifai.org.mx/pdf/Folleto%20Mision%20Vision.pdf. 
Neuman, Laura. “Access to Information Laws: Pieces of the Puzzle – An Analysis of the 
International Norms.” White paper, The Carter Center (2006). 
VOL. 2 JOURNAL OF INFORMATION POLICY 240 
 
 
 
––––––. “Enforcement Models Content and Context.” Access to Information Working Paper Series 
(Washington D.C.: World Bank Institute, 2009). Accessed Oct. 1, 2012, 
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/EXTGOVACC/Resources/LNEumanATI.pdf. 
––––––. “Mechanisms for Monitoring and Enforcing the Right to Information Around the World.” 
In Access to Information: Building a Culture of Transparency, 49-56. Atlanta: The Carter Center, 2006. 
Accessed Oct. 1, 2012, www.cartercenter.org/documents/2364.pdf. 
Nisbet, Miriam. Testimony Before the Senate Subcommittee on Information Policy, Census, and 
National Archives, Washington D.C., Mar. 18, 2010. Accessed Oct. 1, 2012, 
http://judiciary.senate.gov/pdf/09-09-30%20Nisbet%20Testimony.pdf. 
O’Reilly, Emily. “Controlling Access: Responding to Political and Administrative Resistance to 
Access.” Speech at the Seventh International Conference of Information Commissioners, 
Ottawa, Canada, Oct. 5, 2011. Accessed Oct. 1, 2012, 
http://www.oic.gov.ie/en/MediaandSpeeches/Speeches/2011/Name,14553,en.htm. 
––––––. “Freedom of Information: The First Decade.” Speech at the 10th Anniversary Conference 
of Freedom of Information in Ireland (Dublin, May 15, 2008). Accessed Oct. 1, 2012, 
http://www.oic.gov.ie/en/MediaandSpeeches/Speeches/2008/Name,8400,en.htm. 
Open Government Partnership. “About.” Accessed Oct. 1, 2012, 
http://www.opengovpartnership.org/about. 
Open Society Justice Initiative. “Access to Information Laws: Overview and Statutory Goals.” 
right2info.org, Jan. 2012. Accessed Oct. 1, 2012, http://right2info.org/access-to-information-
laws. 
Pasquier, Martial and Philomène Meilland. “Evaluation De La Loi Sur La Transparence.” White 
paper, Idheap (2009). Accessed Oct. 1, 2012, 
http://www.edoeb.admin.ch/dokumentation/00652/01405/index.html?lang=fr. 
Pearlman, Mitchell W. Piercing the Veil of Secrecy: Lessons in the Fight for Freedom of Information, 1st ed. 
New Britain, CT: LawFirst Publishing/Connecticut Bar Association, 2010. 
Piotrowski, Suzanne J., Yahong Zhang, Weiwei Lin, and Wenxuan Yu. “Key Issues for 
Implementation of Chinese Open Government Information Regulations.” Public Administration 
Review 69, no. S1 (2009): S129-S135. 
PriceWaterhouseCoopers. “Final Report: Understanding the Key Issues and Constraints in 
Implementing the RTI Act.” White paper, Delhi, India, June 2009. 
Roberts, Alasdair. “A Great and Revolutionary Law? The First Four Years of India’s Right to 
Information Act.” Public Administration Review 70, no. 6 (2010): 925-933. 
––––––. “Dashed Expectations: Governmental Adaptation to Transparency Rules.” In Transparency: 
The Key to Better Governance?, edited by Christopher Hood and David Heald, 107-125. Oxford: 
British Academy/Oxford University Press, 2006. 
Rowat, Donald C. “Freedom of Information: The Appeal Bodies Under the Access Laws in Canada, 
Australia and New Zealand.” Australian Journal of Public Administration 52, no. 2 (1993): 215-222. 
Scotland, Scottish Information Commissioner. Freedom of Information Annual Report 2009. Fife, 
Scotland: Office of the Scottish Information Commissioner, Mar. 2010. 
––––––. “Scottish Information Commissioner Rules That Mortality Rates for All Surgeons in 
Scotland Should Be Released,” Dec. 8, 2005. Accessed Oct. 1, 2012, 
http://www.itspublicknowledge.info/home/News/20051208.asp. 
Slovenia, Information Commissioner of the Republic of. Annual Report 2010. Ljubljana: Information 
Commissioner of the Republic of Slovenia (June 2011). Accessed Oct. 1, 2012, https://www.ip-
rs.si/fileadmin/user_upload/Pdf/porocila/Annual_Report_2010.pdf. 
Transparency International. Global Corruption Report 2003: Special Focus: Access to Information. London: 
Profile Books, 2003. 
VOL. 2 JOURNAL OF INFORMATION POLICY 241 
 
 
 
United Kingdom, Information Commissioner’s Office. Decision Notice FS50165372 (Cabinet Office). 
Feb. 19, 2008. 
––––––. “Freedom of Information Regulatory Action Policy,” Dec. 2010. Accessed Oct. 1, 2012, 
http://www.ico.gov.uk/what_we_cover/taking_action/foi_eir.aspx. 
––––––. “Our Mission and Vision” (Nov. 3, 2009). Accessed Oct. 1, 2012, 
http://www.ico.gov.uk/about_us/plans_and_priorities/mission_and_vision.aspx. 
Vleugels, Roger. “Fringe Special: Overview of All FOI Laws.” White paper, Oct. 9, 2011. Accessed 
Oct. 1, 2012, http://right2info.org/resources/publications/Fringe%20Special%20-
%2090%20FOIAs%20-%20sep%207%202009.pdf. 
 
 
